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Introduction 
 
 
Combat Drones – Killing Drones 
A Plea against Flying Robots 
Marcel Dickow and Hilmar Linnenkamp 
Medium altitude, long endurance drones are becoming a component of regular air 
forces. However, the extent to which manned aircraft are being replaced by such 
“MALE UAVs” (MALE = Medium Altitude, Long Endurance, UAV = Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle) remains unclear. At present Germany is faced with determining with what 
means the Luftwaffe should be equipped in the medium term (up to 2020) and long-
term (post-2020). Beyond military considerations, there are cooperation and industrial 
policy issues to be taken into account, since no one individual state in Europe can or 
wants to provide the financial means to develop a national MALE UAV model. Although 
European industry has already launched research and development projects, their gov-
ernments are by no means on board. Likewise it is also unclear whether drones are to 
be armed in future. Discussion has been continuing for some time as to how far tar-
geted killings are responsible and permissible. In contrast, no fundamental debate has 
so far taken place about what the ethical consequences are of the trend towards auto-
mated combat. Such a debate is now overdue and urgent, as the momentum of tech-
nological development conceals the danger that human beings may abdicate moral 
responsibility in decisions over the use of force. 
 
In the meantime, MALE UAVs are being 
used in many countries by armed forces 
and intelligence services, by Germany, 
France, Great Britain, the USA and Israel 
amongst others. These drones are being 
continually updated; their deployment 
spectrum is growing and their vulnerability 
diminishing. For the most part so far, they 
are still being used for reconnaissance pur-
poses, but they are increasingly developing 
into weapons platforms. Thanks to tech-
nical advances they can fulfil both roles in 
an ever more effective manner. However, it 
is questionable to what extent the deploy-
ment of such armed systems is defensible 
from legal and ethical points of view. The 
drone war the CIA is waging outside the 
United States for the targeted killing of sus-
pected terrorists is one example of these 
issues. 
Like some of the other European govern-
ments – amongst them the British, French 
and Italian governments – the German gov-
ernment is also considering making MALE-
UAVs a permanent part of its air force. 
Manned and unmanned systems can then 
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be allocated flexibly to both the tasks of 
“reconnaissance” and “airborne support” 
However, if drones were used for the second 
function, the conduct of warfare would 
be embarking on a slippery slope that – 
because of technology – necessarily ends in 
the automatic deployment of lethal means. 
This would leave one fundamental con-
dition for an ethically justifiable action 
unmet: its accountability back to a respon-
sible protagonist. For this reason there 
needs to be a public debate, asking whether 
embarking upon the use of armed drones is 
permissible or whether one should not con-
sciously renounce this weapon. 
Plans: Drones in the Bundeswehr 
MALE-UAVs are at present the most 
advanced of the (unmanned) remotely-
controlled aerial systems with fixed wings. 
These are aircraft with wing spans of more 
than 15 metres and an in-service time of 
more than 15 hours. They are designed 
with maximum range and endurance in 
mind rather than payload and speed. The 
manufacturers dominating the market 
are the US General Atomics company (with 
its “MQ-1 Predator” and “MQ-9 Reaper” 
models) as well as Israel Aerospace Indus-
tries, IAI (“Heron 1”, “Heron TP”). 
In Afghanistan the Bundeswehr deploys 
– in addition to some smaller, “tactical” 
drones – the Israeli “Heron”, which has 
been leased from IAI in a joint venture with 
Rheinmetall Defence. However the leasing 
contract comes to an end in October 2014, 
which is why a follow-up solution is under 
discussion. In the summer of 2012, defence 
minister Thomas de Maizière and repre-
sentatives of the Bundeswehr repeatedly 
spoke up for the procurement of armed 
surveillance drones. Although the “Heron” 
platform – which is only used for recon-
naissance purposes – has proved its worth 
to the German armed forces, its deploy-
ment does at the same time give rise to the 
wish to be able to react immediately to 
identifiable crisis situations on the ground 
with a weapon, instead of having to restrict 
oneself to “looking on”. Some people think 
that there is no fundamental reason to ob-
ject to the procurement of a relevantly 
equipped drone, since a weapon is always 
to be regarded as “ethically neutral”. Others 
have strong objections to this. 
Apparently, plans have been mooted to 
procure an already available combat drone 
as an interim solution and, in parallel with 
this, to develop a European drone by 2020. 
Such thinking does not, however, answer 
the question as to which concrete deploy-
ment scenarios the Bundeswehr would 
plausibly be involved in for the use of 
armed surveillance drones. Information 
on this is provided neither by a May 2011 
report of the Bundestag’s Office for Asses-
sing the Consequences of Technology, 
nor the German government’s answer to a 
passing query from the Green Party. In its 
April 2012 statement the government only 
indicates that for armed UAV systems, “the 
most likely tasking [...] would be in the field 
of international conflict prevention and 
crisis management”. In another answer to 
a parliamentary question from Die Linke 
(a parliamentary party), the government 
concretized in January 2013, that armed 
UAV would offer an enduring capability to 
protect ground forces in rapidly changing 
security environments and persistently 
threaten enemy forces in an unpredictable 
manner. This is formulated against the 
background of the highly specialised 
Afghanistan- scenario that is too narrow 
to be able to serve as a criterion for the 
necessity of any procurement. Moreover, 
such terms of reference are hardly fit to 
serve as a catalyst for ethical debate. 
Review: Deployment in War 
Unmanned and remotely-controlled aerial 
systems have been deployed since the begin-
ning of the 90s, above all for the surveil-
lance of deployment areas and the recon-
naissance of targets, both places and 
people. They are used in particular if the 
targets to be monitored are small and 
mobile, causing the usual strategic recon-
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naissance (with satellites or radar) to be 
ineffective. 
Conflicts with a high percentage of 
irregular combatants in dynamic, small 
groups have markedly driven up the deploy-
ment of reconnaissance drones. In this they 
have functioned with their sensors and, 
where applicable, light precision arma-
ment, as air support for ground troops. 
Present-day MALE drones do not, however, 
have any protection of their own and can 
only be operated in closed air space. In the 
2011 Libyan war, the USA also deployed 
armed drones of the “MQ-9 Reaper” type to 
hunt military and political officials of the 
later toppled Gaddafi regime. Since the end 
of the 90s drones have thus developed from 
pure reconnaissance means into a tool of 
personalised, “surgical” warfare. 
This trend was set by Israel’s way of pro-
ceeding after the eruption of the second 
Intifada in the year 2000, when drones 
were also used against the commanders of 
the Palestinian resistance in the autono-
mous areas. As late as summer 2001 the US 
administration was describing such oper-
ations as illegitimate. But after the attacks 
of September 11, it was the American intel-
ligence services above all who discovered 
armed drones as proven means for the war 
on terror. Due to their great operating 
range they can have terrorist suspects 
under surveillance while still in their sup-
posed safe havens and, if necessary, attack 
them. 
Since the mid-2000s the USA has been 
using such deployments in the Afghan-
Pakistani border region, in Pakistan’s Wazi-
ristan and also in Yemen and in Somalia. 
The operations – about which there was no 
official confirmation on Washington’s part 
up to April 2012 – are aimed at supposed 
members of the Taliban, of al-Qa’ida and 
terror groups in their orbit. Functionaries 
identified in the terror networks are 
sought, monitored and killed in a targeted 
fashion. In addition, the USA is carrying 
out so-called “signature strikes”, which are 
aimed at persons whose identifiable con-
duct fits a terrorist template, but who are 
not identified individually. The legality of 
these strikes is extremely questionable. 
Criticism of the Use of 
Armed Drones 
From the outset, the use of armed surveil-
lance drones has encountered criticism. So 
far this relates above all to targeted killings 
in the war on terror, less on the conse-
quences of the upcoming automatisation 
of weapons systems. For this reason too, 
arguments based on international law and 
policy dominate the debate. 
For some years the academic community 
in particular has been discussing the legal-
ity of targeted killings and the drawing up 
of so-called “kill lists”. A trigger for this was 
the action of the American intelligence ser-
vices in Pakistan. In selecting targets, the 
Obama administration refers to the right 
of self-defence. They say it also permits per-
sons who appear to be supporters in terror-
ist activities against the USA to be attacked. 
This far-ranging interpretation of the right 
to self-defence is however – also inde-
pendently of drone deployment – disputed, 
in particular when the persons targeted are 
not currently taking part in violent oper-
ations. Such targets do not become legiti-
mate simply through the selective targeting 
of military weapons – that is, by the fact 
that civilians are protected thanks to the 
precision of the attack. The technological 
capability to avoid collateral damage does 
not yet justify the use of force. 
The question is not, however, whether 
according to international humanitarian 
law armed drones in principle infringe 
the principle of discrimination (that is, the 
necessary differentiation between combat-
ants and civilians) or the dictate of pro-
portionality. On the contrary – as drones 
are in the air for significant periods of time 
over the area of operations, it is theoretical-
ly much easier for them to differentiate 
between civilians and military personnel. A 
decision must be made about the legitima-
cy of an attack in each individual case. If 
precision weapons are used (such as laser-
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guided bombs or air-to-ground Hellfire mis-
siles), the principle of the proportionality 
of weapons deployments must also be taken 
into account. Within the framework of 
existing armaments control systems there 
are, however, no restrictions on unmanned 
armed platforms. 
The deployment of armed drones does, 
however, have repercussions on the nature 
of the conflict itself. The attacking side pre-
fers the anonymity of drone strikes to the 
classic use of force because it fears an esca-
lation of the conflict and finding itself 
entangled in foreign disputes. In turn, the 
side affected will adopt even more asym-
metric retaliation, given its technological 
inferiority. Supporters of drones emphasize 
that such platforms are precisely the right 
means for democracies to wage war, as self-
endangerment and possible collateral 
damage can be minimised through pre-
cision weapons. That military force can 
be used more effectively and more cost-
efficiently through drones does, however, 
provoke the question as to whether this 
causes the threshold for the use of weapons 
also to sink. In principle the remote-control 
of armed platforms enables and promotes 
the implication of civilians – such as intel-
ligence services personnel or industry 
representatives – in the killing of those in-
volved in the conflict. They could be held 
even directly responsible for a correspond-
ing decision to attack, even though they are 
not part of the regular armed forces and do 
not possess a combatant status under inter-
national law of conflict (LOC). If drones are 
deployed directly by intelligence services, 
this would also lead to a legal grey zone as 
regards the definition of regular combat-
ants and the legitimisation of non-military 
violence. 
En Route to Robots 
Remotely-controlled aerial systems with 
weaponry only signify an interim stage en 
route to more decision-making autonomy 
for weapons systems. In the continued 
development of unmanned platforms sev-
eral technological trends can be observed at 
present. 
Miniaturisation of components and systems: 
Driven by tinier and tinier and ever more 
capable processors, even the smallest of 
aerial vehicles can fly and react indepen-
dently and in a stable manner. Only 
rechargeable battery technology still places 
tight restrictions on the flying time of these 
mostly electrically-operated systems. 
Platform automatisation and autonomisation: 
Unmanned aerial systems are becoming in-
creasingly autonomous in their movement. 
This is attributable to the increasing com-
puting capacity of processors (with almost 
the same power consumption), the minia-
turisation of sensors (for location, accelera-
tion, optoelectronics, GPS etc.) and modern 
algorithms, for example to reduce the com-
plexity of sensor data in depicting the en-
vironment. Today drones can already pro-
duce the ideal orbit to monitor a specific 
target themselves and to self-adjust for 
weather conditions. Likewise, if the radio 
connection is lost, they can independently 
return to a previously defined point and 
land (autopilot). The next generation of 
reconnaissance drones will possess sensor 
technology with which several targets can 
be kept under surveillance at the same 
time. This requires the course to be ad-
justed to optimal surveillance conditions at 
the ground station in real time. The devel-
opment of faster flying drones does, how-
ever, mean that this automatisation will in 
future no longer be implemented on the 
ground but on board, so that the platform 
can react immediately to changing con-
ditions. This is because long signal routes 
via satellites increase processing time. Once 
UAVs assume tasks from currently still 
manned combat aircraft, for example, 
achieving air supremacy and air policing – 
piloting remotely will no longer be pos-
sible. This trend is a step on from the pres-
ent-day “joystick” process (manual remote-
operation) to autonomous task manage-
ment, in which only the framework con-
ditions are defined by a human operator. As 
the complexity of operation will no longer 
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be manageable by humans in real time, 
only the confirmation or rejection of a 
solution suggested by the machine will 
remain the human’s job. Under these con-
ditions real decision-making autonomy on 
the part of the human – even with regard 
to target selection – would no longer be a 
given. 
Increase in sensors and automatisation of the 
sensor data processing: Already, manned and 
unmanned platforms are from generation 
to generation being equipped with more 
sensors. High resolution cameras are either 
being complemented by similarly high 
resolution video cameras or being replaced 
by multi-spectrum sensors (in particular 
infrared). To these are added “synthetic 
aperture radar” systems (SAR), which can 
see through cloud cover and tree canopies. 
The number of sensors is only restricted by 
the load limit and the electrical power of 
the power generators on board. The com-
panies carrying out development are im-
proving both capabilities with each new 
drone generation. In so doing, they are 
aiming to accommodate several sets of 
sensor packs on board so that different 
targets can be monitored at the same time. 
Even today, surveillance drones are pro-
ducing more data than one person or even 
whole teams can evaluate in real time. 
These issues have long been known in the 
field of security technology, in particular 
that of civil surveillance technology. Com-
panies and research institutes worldwide 
are working on developing algorithms 
that can automatically evaluate the digital 
imagery from surveillance cameras. This 
should make it possible to identify specific 
persons in crowds or to identify “suspi-
cious” behaviour. Surveillance authorities 
in the USA and Great Britain are already 
deploying such processes to monitor public 
spaces. These developments will also be 
made use of in the evaluation of drone 
sensor data in order to manage the copious 
amount of information. So far the pro-
grammes concerned are comparatively 
computer-intensive for modern hardware 
architecture and relatively error-ridden as 
well. Automated evaluation of the sensor 
data is, however, indispensable if the 
desired progress is to be achieved – if 
human beings do not put the brakes on 
for reasons other than technology. 
The trend toward automatisation and 
autonomisation of flying platforms, like-
wise data evaluation, is also changing the 
role of the human protagonist. If until 
now he has adopted a position within the 
decision-making process of being “in the 
loop”, he will thereafter become a mere 
observer and confirmer of an approach 
determined by machines “on the loop”. This 
can already be said of reconnaissance sys-
tems which are being deployed linked in 
with weapons on other platforms. The data, 
on which the machines’ decisions are 
based, are here too so comprehensive and 
complex that they cannot be absorbed by 
people in real time. In principle, however, 
the dynamics of flight systems and oper-
ational processes require instantaneous 
decisions, increasingly so with UAVs. These 
issues will become even more acute when 
weapons are deployed by UAVs, whether 
in the form of correspondingly equipped 
drones or by the special unmanned combat 
aircraft of the future. 
It can be foreseen that, with coming 
generations of armed unmanned aerial 
systems, humans will merely stand at the 
end of a chain of options pre-selected by 
machine, whose origins he cannot pene-
trate. In addition the weapons (not the 
weapons platforms) will take electronically 
guided decisions in consultation with the 
respective platforms fractions of seconds 
before impact, in which humans will no 
longer be able to intervene due to their 
relatively long reaction time. It is for in-
stance conceivable that the weapon makes 
a facial identification of the target whilst in 
the air. Human beings as decision-makers 
with ethics and morality are therefore 
abdicating responsibility and a robot can-
not be held responsible. So far, neither 
computers nor algorithms exist, which 
can reproduce behaviour constituted from 
knowledge, experience and morals, as 
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characteristic of human beings, in the form 
of an ethical mechanised agent. 
The technological development of UAVs 
is inevitably advancing along the path of 
automatisation. The German government 
is now faced with the question of how far it 
wants to go along this path. In the sense of 
preventive arms control a ban on the devel-
opment, procurement and deployment of 
autonomously acting weapons platforms 
could be conceivable. Since it could be dif-
ficult at a later point in time to push 
through the disarmament of autonomously 
acting UAVs, the separation of platform and 
weaponry seems to make sense in this pres-
ent-day technological phase. The resulting 
capability limitations should be conscious-
ly accepted, bearing in mind the legal 
and ethical consequence of future weapons 
deployment by robotic platforms. 
Market and Industry Interests 
The use of MALE UAVs is not only being 
discussed in Germany. France and Great 
Britain in particular are facing medium- 
and long-term procurement decisions. In 
this all three countries want to keep open 
the option of a European home develop-
ment for the time post-2020. Great Britain 
has in fact procured ten armed drones of 
the American MQ-9 type, which are being 
deployed in Afghanistan. At the same time, 
however, in collaboration with France, the 
British government is planning to develop 
its own MALE drone within the framework 
of the “Telemos” project. On the industry 
side, BAE Systems, the British armament 
and aerospace concern, and Dassault Avia-
tion, the French aircraft manufacturer, are 
taking part in this. 
There is, however, no consensus amongst 
the potential users on weaponry, size and 
design of a future European MALE UAV, not 
to mention on harmonised requirements. 
As no firm partners have committed them-
selves, the role of industry is still very un-
clear, in particular after the failed fusion of 
BAE and EADS. Germany and France did 
in fact make a non-binding declaration of 
intent in September 2012 that they were 
desirous of collaborating in the develop-
ment of a European MALE UAV. However an 
agreement on a joint interim solution has 
not yet been reached. Under pressure of the 
financial crisis, France will not be able to 
produce the means to finance two parallel 
bilateral development programmes with 
Great Britain and Germany. 
So far the market has been marginal for 
civilian variants of the UAV. In the main, 
small and micro-systems are deployed in 
the public and private business sector, such 
as for the monitoring of demonstrations at 
Castor Transport (nuclear waste transpor-
tation), to check plant installations in the 
chemical industry or for fertilising agri-
cultural land. However there are prognoses 
that civilian demand will expand consider-
ably. Non-military market potential is aris-
ing above all from the technological 
developments in MALE UAVs. In the non-
commercial area such drones could, for 
example, be of assistance to state protago-
nists in combating the drugs’ trade in 
border regions. Here too one would profit 
from the long operating time of these plat-
forms and the associated cost-efficiency. As 
they also enjoy a clearly expanded operat-
ing range, MALE drones can monitor larger 
areas than the usual small systems. It 
would also be conceivable for them to sup-
port the Red Cross, for instance, in catas-
trophe scenarios. As regards a commercial 
usage, above all one thinks of the search for 
mineral resources and the monitoring of 
infrastructure. Thus, for example, drones 
could be used to inspect pipeline and rail 
networks for damage. 
Small and micro-drones already require 
a flight permit in Germany (as also in most 
of the other EU states). For most operational 
purposes, this can be obtained without dif-
ficulty. Small drones operate below the 
regulated air space and are controlled by 
visual contact. In contrast MALE UAVs can 
only operate in areas which are closed to 
normal air traffic, as they are currently 
not permitted in regulated air space. It has 
therefore not been possible until now to 
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use such systems commercially. Military 
systems are only flown in EU air corridors 
which have been closed especially on a tem-
porary basis. However, in the near future 
the EU wants to create the legal prerequi-
sites for integrating unmanned systems 
into regular air traffic. For this, first of all, 
technologies have to be developed which 
compensate for the missing pilot in the 
cockpit. This requires in particular the 
capability of avoiding other air traffic on 
sight (sense and avoid) and, if necessary, to 
fly without radio and data traffic (autono-
my). In this context the EU is drawing up 
a standardised permit process for the air-
worthiness of drones. It is planned to safe-
guard the integration of UAVs through a 
new air traffic management system with 
corresponding guidelines. The requirement 
for a civil use of drones is promoting this 
development. Although military systems 
also have to be licensed, the temporary 
establishment of closed air space corridors 
is at present sufficient, due to their low 
numbers. 
EU governments and European industry 
must ask themselves whether the techno-
logical capability to develop and produce 
MALE-UAVs should be developed and main-
tained in Europe. Does the EU need one or 
several system integrators, i.e. large enter-
prises that can cover the entire value chain 
for the UAV product? If the answer to this 
question is no, then the users are placing 
themselves for the medium-term in a posi-
tion of dependency on American or Israeli 
platforms, even if individual components 
(for example, the sensor technology) can 
be manufactured in Europe. If the answer 
is yes then the question begs itself as to 
whether there is to be a coordinated pro-
cess within the EU. Without coordination, 
there would be a danger of national subsidy 
by individual states increasing costs, raising 
licensing efforts and restricting competi-
tiveness on the global market. In all likeli-
hood, it is also true that only military sys-
tems would then be developed, only per-
mitting small numbers to be manufac-
tured, hardly allowing for exports. 
If, in contrast, the most significant EU 
states can agree to a coordinated process 
for development and procurement, then 
volume would increase and European air 
space licences would only have to be ob-
tained for one system.  
At the same time, the partners in the 
consortium would pool their efforts; eco-
nomic considerations would contribute to 
the consolidation of effort. One design, 
that places the UAV’s surveillance function 
before the armament capability, would 
enhance both the civil market potential 
and export chances at one and the same 
time. For this to work, however, the partici-
pating states would have to consolidate 
their need and agree joint requirements. 
Recommendations for a German and 
European “Drone Policy” 
In this situation it seems sensible to look 
at three courses of further action on MALE 
UAVs. These are closely connected and 
should be discussed at parliamentary and 
government levels and in the public arena. 
 Continued use of the “Heron” system 
leased so far. As France also uses a modi-
fied version of this drone and is contem-
plating extending the use of the system, 
in the medium-term bilateral coopera-
tion between Germany and France based 
on the “Heron” platform appears obvi-
ous, which would also be supported by 
industry in both countries. 
 Refraining from a headlong rush into an 
armament-capable or even armed US sys-
tem such as “MQ-1 Predator” or “MQ-9 
Reaper. This would admittedly mean an 
“off the shelf” purchase which could be 
correspondingly cost-effective. Such a 
decision would, however, prejudice one 
route in future, which would pre-empt 
the necessary ethical debate about the 
accountability or justification of armed 
drones. 
 Introduction of targeted cooperation 
between Great Britain, France and Ger-
many with the aim, in the long-term – 
that is for the period post-2020 – of devel-
 SWP Comments 4 
February 2013 
8 
oping a European reconnaissance and 
surveillance MALE-UAV. In the EU efforts 
should be made anyway (with the sup-
port of the Commission as well) to inte-
grate UAVs into the regulated air space. 
In this way the prerequisite will also be 
created for MALE-UAVs to be used as civil 
and militarily-deployable instruments 
of a comprehensive security policy. The 
military need alone would not come any-
where close to exhausting the market 
potential of airborne surveillance sys-
tems. Rather, such a one-sided use would 
only bring with it low production vol-
umes with correspondingly high costs. 
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